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Currently, around 7.5 billion people live on our planet
and scenarios for the future show a plausible range
from 8.5 to over 12 billion before the population will
level off or start to decline, depending on the future
course of fertility andmortality (1, 2). These people will
also have to cope with the consequences of climate
change that may be in the range of 1.5 °C to more
than 3 °C, depending on the scale of mitigation
efforts. The paper by Scovronick et al. in PNAS on
the “Impact of population growth and population
ethics on climate change mitigation policy” (3) links
these two global megatrends and asks how differ-
ent population scenarios change the rationale for
mitigation policies and vice versa. The paper shows
convincingly that the answers depend on a rather
abstract philosophical choice: namely, whether the
goal is to maximize total utility (TU) or average
utility (AU).
The field of population ethics, which deals with this
question, is tricky because it is filled with contradic-
tions and unacceptable conclusions, whatever posi-
tion one takes on the issue. Ever since Bentham, the
dominant utilitarian position has been that the overall
goal is to maximize the wellbeing of the largest pos-
sible number of people. Under this TU view, the aver-
age wellbeing of people is multiplied with the number
of people. But this would also imply that a world with
many more people, who on average have a lower level
of wellbeing than today, would be better, if it results in
a higher TU. Since this implication is difficult to accept,
it has also been labeled the “repugnant conclusion”
(4). Much has been written about this unsatisfactory
conclusion and many ways of dealing with it have
been proposed (5), with a focus on average welfare
instead of TU being the most popular one, since it
seems most plausible and straightforward from a
social science perspective: the task at hand is to
improve the wellbeing of people alive and not that
of hypothetical and possibly astronomically larger pop-
ulations still to be born. However, this AU approach has
not found much acceptance among philosophers
because it also leads to implausible conclusions, such
as that a society in which everybody leads a good life
would be worse than a world of just one person lead-
ing an even better life (6).
What may seem like a rather esoteric philosophical
debate, however, has direct implications for assessing
Fig. 1. Global population trends to 2100 by level of educational attainment
according to the SSP1 (A) and SSP3 (B) scenarios. Reprinted with permission from
ref. 14.
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the level of optimal climate change mitigation activities on the
basis of cost-benefit climate–economy models (CEM). All leading
CEMs have a TU approach underlying their models, which not
only implies that a much bigger future world population would
be better (unless this is associated with much lower welfare per
person), but also implies that damages caused by climate change
to a bigger future population are more serious, and thus justify
more costly mitigation action now than in the case of low popu-
lation growth. Under an AU approach, population growth would
be less relevant for mitigation costs. The Scovronick et al. (3)
paper shows that the difference in results of CEMs due to the
TU vs. AU choice is as large as that of the hotly debated choice
of discount rates. This finding alone makes the Scovronick et al.
report an important paper.
Going beyond this specific point made within the framework of
CEM models, one must ask, however, whether the highly artificial
world of CEMs is really very useful in terms of dealing with real-
world policy implications and priority setting. As a demographer
working on world population scenarios and the interactions
between population growth and climate change without using
this framework, I feel uneasy with many of the strong assumptions
made in most CEMs. The first reason is that in these models, gross
domestic product and income are still fully and unconditionally
equated with human wellbeing. I would have thought that after
decades of justified criticism of such an approach and the highly
influential Stiglitz et al. (7) report on “mismeasuring our lives,”
such assumptions would at least be qualified. The CEMs go even
further in making the highly problematic choice to put a specific
dollar price tag on the value of a human life lost due to climate
change. Since this price tag is made dependent on national in-
come levels, a life in the United States is considered many times
more valuable than a life lost in Africa. This raises serious ethical
issues related to equity.
Another problem in my view is the fact that such models treat
human beings essentially as passive victims and not as active
agents who can also adapt to changing conditions. The economic
production function used does not consider improvements in
human skills as a driver of economic growth, nor does the
estimation of the consequences of climate change consider
changes in adaptive capacity. A more appropriate view would
see humans as agents who, if they are empowered through
education and other capabilities, can actively contribute to raising
their standards of living and helping themselves and others for
having better and longer lives and adapting to the challenges
posed by climate change. There is a large body of literature
showing that better education clearly contributes to better health
and better incomes through influencing our cognitive function,
abstract thinking, and planning horizons, changes attitudes and
behaviors, and equips us with better social and economic
opportunities (8–11). It also has been argued that improvements
in education enhance adaptive capacity to climate change in fu-
ture generations in a predictable way (12). And there can be no
doubt that education of women is a key factor for bringing about
voluntary fertility decline in high-fertility countries, which in con-
sequence will lead to lower population growth. Hence, human
agency associated with empowerment through education matters
greatly for population growth, as well as for economic growth and
for adaptive capacity to climate change.
For operationalizing such a view of human agency and
capabilities in a quantitative way, one must explicitly account for
population heterogeneity. In quantitative models, population
heterogeneity is best captured by measurable and observable
individual characteristics, such as age, gender, level of education,
labor force participation, occupation/income, and place of resi-
dence. When it comes to empowerment, then education levels by
age and gender stand out as being of particular relevance. It has
been argued that these three demographic dimensions are the
most important sources of observable population heterogeneity
when it comes to linking population growth and climate change
(12). This view has over the past years also been translated into
alternative scenarios by a broad consortium of scientists working
on climate change and integrated assessment models in the form
of the so-called SSPs (shared socioeconomic pathways) (13).
These SSPs have been developed to capture the socioeconomic
challenges associated with both climate change mitigation and
adaptation. They capture possible future developments under
which mitigation efforts and costs on the one hand, and climate
change damages and adaptation costs on the other, depend on
the future pathways taken. Different pathways are also associated
with very different trajectories of population growth and human
capital formation. They show that future population growth is
clearly not independent from the other socioeconomic trends that
matter for climate change mitigation and adaptation, something
for which the CEMs do not account.
Fig. 1 illustrates this for two of the more extreme SSP scenarios in
terms of population growth trajectories broken down by the educa-
tional attainment of the world population. While the gray area in Fig.
1 refers to children below age 15 y, the red area shows adults that
have never been to school and the dark blue shows those with post-
secondary education. SSP1 gives the case of very rapid social devel-
opment that, together with the other economic and technological
variables considered in the SSP, is labeled “sustainability.” In con-
trast, SSP3 shows the case of stalled social development, which has
also been labeled “dividedworld” (14). Consistent with the narratives
of these two scenarios, SSP1 shows a rapid education expansion with
aworld population peaking aroundmidcentury at a level of 8.5 billion
people, while SSP3 shows education stalls associated with continued
population growth that reaches almost 13 billion by the end of the
century. This is likely associated with low human development and
misery, which is enhanced by climate change, while the low popula-
tion trajectory of SSP1 is associatedwithmuch higher average human
wellbeing and likely lower mitigation and adaptation costs.
Where does this leave us with respect to the broader
consideration of population ethics when linking the two mega-
trends of population growth and climate change? We have seen
that the two are not independent and illustrated how the
consideration of population heterogeneity and enhancement of
human capabilities link both by leading to lower population
growth, higher average wellbeing not only in terms of income but
also health and other nonmonetary dimensions, and to lower
mitigation and adaptation costs. Hence, for the time horizon until
the end of this century, which has been discussed here and for
which the SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios indicated a plausible range of
future population trends, SSP1 seems clearly preferable both
under an AU and a TU perspective. Even under a TU perspective,
the difference in average wellbeing under these specific scenarios
is larger than the difference in total population size.
What about the future beyond 2100? Recent model calcula-
tions, which assume that during the second half of this century all
parts to the world will have fertility levels of 1.5–1.75—which is the
current average of industrialized countries, including China—
show that, depending on life expectancy having a ceiling at
90 or 120 y, world population in 2200 would come to lie within
a range of 2–6 billion (15). But this would only be possible if Africa
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experienced a rapid education expansion followed by economic
growth. However, this scenario provides the positive vision of the
real possibility of a world of 2–6 billion well-educated, and there-
fore healthy and wealthy people, who will able to successfully
cope with the consequences of already unavoidable climate
change (16). I would much rather see my great grandchildren
living in such world than in a SSP3 world, even if the absolute
number of decedents carrying my genes should be smaller. And
the danger that in the distant future people start to have lower
levels of wellbeing because they feel lonely on this planet does
not seem to be a likely problem for the foreseeable future and
might be easily solvable by communication technology.
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